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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
IN RE CONTEMPT
of

NEUMAN C. PETTY,

Case No.
10690

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Neuman C. Petty, appeals from
a judgment of the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge
of the Third Judicial District Court, finding the said
Neuman C. Petty in contempt of court for refusal to
testify in the trial of Billie Maurine Newsom, then
pending in the District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Neuman C. Petty, was called as
a witness on behalf of the State of Utah to testify in
the case of State of Utah v. Billie Maurine Newsom,
Criminal No. 19534, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Mr. Petty, after giving his name and address, re-
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fused to answer any further questions posed by
counsel on the grounds that the answers would
tend to incriminate him. The Honorable Merrill C.
Faux, judge, determined that the appellant's invocation of the privilege was not proper and adjudged
the appellant in contempt of court. The appellant
was sentenced to be imprisoned in the county jail
for, a period of 30 days.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the adjudication
of the appellant's contempt should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement
of facts, in addition to those set forth in the appellant's brief and in supplement there to:
The appellant was called as a witness on behalf of the State in the case of State of Utah v. Billie
Maurine Newsom. Criminal No. 19534 (Tr. 51). Prior
to the time the appellant was asked to testify, counsel for Mrs. Newsom, who had apparently been ,
counsel for Mr. Petty, at one time, advised the court
that Mr. Petty intended to invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination (Tr. 51). Counsel indicated
that the indictment against Mrs. Newsom arose out
of the proceeding of the Salt Lake County Grand
Jury during 1965. He further advised the court that
Mr. Petty was under indictment for the crime of
con$piracy to commit certain crimes in violation of
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Title 76, Chapter 12, Section 1.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. A copy of that indictment appears in
the record, page 9, of this appeal. Subsequent to
argument, the district attorney, Mr. Jay E. Banks,
was sworn and testified to a conversation he had
with Mr. Petty (Tr. 58). He stated:
"My name is Jay E. Banks; I am the District Attorney in the Third Judicial District. I have knowledge as of this time-independent knowledge-that
the defendant in this case, Maurine-or Billy Maurine
Newsom-went to Mr. Petty-Newman C. Pettyprior to June 30th of 1965 and told him that she had
taken some $400 and-approximately $460.00-and
that she offered to repay it; and that a payroll deduction was taken out of two of her checks of $23.25
each; and, then, that she paid Motor Lease, who was
employed-who had employed her-and a balance in
a check from her checking account in the sum of, oh,
$419-and-something, approximately."

Mr. Banks testified his knowledge came from a conversation with Mr. Petty before trial.
Subsequent to the district attorney's testimony,
he made a motion to dismiss so much of the conspiracy charge in Criminal Case No. 19538 as was
then pending against the witness, Neuman C. Petty.
Thereafter, three questions were asked of the witness, which he refused to answer. The first question
was as follows:
"Q During the year of 1964 and 1965, were you affiliated with Motor Lease?"

The court stated that it had reviewed the matter and,
in the opinion of the court, the question did call for
"an answer and will not be incriminating nor degrading" (Tr. 73). In the face of the court's advice,
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counsel for the appellant continued to advise his
client not to answer the questions. m The appellant
then refused to answer the question. The district
attorney then asked if Mr. Petty would answer any
question other than his name and address. Counsel
for the appellant indicated that he would advise his
client not to answer any questions (Tr. 74). The district attorney then put the second question to the
appellant, which was as follows:
"Q All right; then, I will ask you if-ifyou know
Maurine--or Billy Maurine Newsom?"

Appellant refused to answer the question on the
grounds that the answer would tend to incriminate
him. The court advised the appellant that it could
see nothing in the answer which would tend to incriminate him and directed that the question be
answered. Appellant refused (Tr. 75). Subsequently,
the district attorney asked the third question, which
was as follows:
"Q I will ask you if you were ever present when a
conversation was had with Mrs. Newsom, the defendant in this case, relative to any missing funds
in Motor Lease?"

Again, the appellant refused to answer the question.
The court determined that the question was proper
and admonished appellant to answer and he refused. The district attorney then forewent any further questioning, and the court adjudged the appellant in contempt of court.
(1)

At this time, Mr. Robert McRae appeared and represented the appellant.
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Based upon the above facts and those allied
facts set forth in the brief of appellant, non-argumentative in nature, respondent submits that the
adjudication of contempt should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT THE APPELLANT'S INVOCATION OF THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
WAS IMPROPER, SINCE FROM THE RECORD, IT
APPEARS THAT THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS POSED WOULD NOT TEND TO INCRIMINATE THE APPELLANT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Respondent concedes, for the purposes of this
appeal only, that it is improper for a court to order
a witness to answer a question, the answer to which
might tend to incriminate the witness, even though,
if the witness did. in fact, answer over his invocation
of the privilege, a.fter being so directed by the court,
the evidence could not be used against him. State
v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723. The respondent does not, however, concede the correctness of
the ruling in the Byington case, as such, but concedes that if Mr. Petty's invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination was proper, he could not
be found in contempt merely because, had he testified after admonition by the court, the evidence
could not have been used against him. Raley v.
Ohio, 360 US 423 (1957). The respondent concedes
that the privilege against self-incrimination pro-
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tected the witness from being coerced to answer
questions which may tend to incriminate him in the
absence of a grant of immunity, even though, were
he compelled to give the evidence, it could not be
used against him. Section 77-31-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
It is, however, the position of the respondent
that the questions posed by the district attorney,
which the appellant refused to answer were (1) so
innocuous and unlikely to incriminate as to warrant
the court in determining that the invocation of the
privilege was unjustified and (2) that in view of the
district attorney's dismissal of the conspiracy charge
against the appellant, there was no likelihood of incrimination and that the court's finding of contempt
was justified.

The respondent acknowledges that the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, as well as the provisions of Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, protect an individual who is a witness from
giving testimony which will tend to incriminate him.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, (1963).
It is submitted that the trial court, however,
could correctly determine from the position of the
case before him that there was no likelihood that
the answers to the questions posed by the district
attorney, if given by Mr. Petty, would tend to incriminate him.

Section 77°31-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, allows the prosecution at any time before the defendants have gone into their defense to apply to
the court for dismissal of the charge in exchange
for the testimony of the defendant as a witness for
the State. In the instant case, the district attorney
dismissed the charges against the witness, Neuman
C. Petty; on the indictment for conspiracy pending
in the district court. Consequently, this dismissal,
in exchange for his testimony under the above statute, and 77-31-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, would
preclude subsequent prosecution of the case, and
therefore· give to the witness protection agairk-1
prosecution relating to that charge. It could not
therefore be contended that any testimony that Petty
gave would be likely to incriminate him under the
pending indictment. Even so, -it is submitted that
the questions posed by the district attorney were so
preliminary and so innocuous that there was no real
likelihood that the answers the witness might give
would be likely to incriminate.

It is well settled that a claim of privilege must
be more than a fanciful or imaginary danger; it must
be real and relate to a "probability" of prosecution.
4 Jones, Evidence, Sec. 861 (l 958). McCormick, Evidence, p. 271 (1954), comments on the- required
showing:
''A classic statement of the test is that 'the Court
must see, from the circumstances of the case, and the
nature of the evidence which the witness is called to
give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend
danger to the witness from his being compelled to
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answer. It seems that to meet this test the court must
find ( 1) that· there is substantial probability that
the witness has committed a crime under the law of
the forum and (2) that the fact called for is an essential part of the crime, or is a fact which taken
with other facts already proved, or which may probably be proved, would make out a circumstantial
case of guilt."

See also Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2261.
In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917),
the United States Supreme Court noted the general
standard was expressed:
"The constitutional protection against self-incrimination 'is confined to real danger and does not extend
to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of
law.' "

Further, the court noted:
"The general rule under which the trial judge filust
determine each claim according to its own particular
circumstances, we think, is indicated with adequate
certainty in the above cited opinions. Ordinarily, he
is in much better position to appreciate the essential
facts than an appellate court can hold and he must
be permitted to exercise some discretion, fructified by
common sense, when dealing with this necessarily
difficult subject. Unless there has been a distinct
denial of a right guaranteed, we ought not to interfere.
"In the present case the witnesses certainly were not
relieved from answering merely because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the
enforced answer, ' I don't know,' given by Mason to
the second question, after he had refused to replay
under a claim of constitutional privilege."
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The first questton uf whether the witness, Neuman Petty, was associated with Motor Lease could
hardly tend to incriminate him where there was no
conspiracy charge pending against him, and his
mere association with the company would in no
way draw him to liability for some remote wrongdoing. Certainly, also, the ·question of whether or
not he knew the defendant in the instant case was
a neutral question, the answer to which would not
place the appellant in any position where it would
tend to incriminate him. Whether he knew Billie
Maurine Newsom or not would hardly be an incriminating factor, and there was no indication that
merely knowing her would lead to his prosecution
or the likelihood of his being charged or convicted
of any offense, nor even, for that matter, be relevant or responsive to the conspiracy indictment
which was barred by the district attorney's dismissal
under the provisions of Section 77-31-9, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. Certainly, those two questions
were so innocuous that they posed no real possibility that the witness would be placed in jeopardy
had he responded in each instance with a simple
"yes" answer, ·which was the obvious conclusion
called for.
The question as to whether he had ever had a
conversation with Mrs. Newsom relative to any
missing funds in Motor Lease is equally innocuous,
and the premise the appellant now seeks to sustain
the basis for his refusal to answer has no legal
merit. The district attorney's testimony was to the
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effect that he ha'd -a conversation with Mr~ Peffy in
which Mr. Petty acknowledged that Billie Maurine
Newsom had embezzled some money from Motor
Lease, Inc., and that it had been paid back. Appellant attempts to raise this action into the area of
making Mr. Petty an accessory to a crime. If Mr.
Petty was an officer of Motor Lease, which he was,
he would certainly have a right to make arrangements to recoup funds converted by an employee.
Further, an agreement to accept repayment of funds
and not to pursue any further prosecution would
not render the appellant an accessory. Section 76-145, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines "accessories as follows:
"All persons who, after full knowledge that a felony
has been committed, conceal it from a magistrate, or
harbor and protect the person who committed it, are
accessories."
-

There is no affirmative obligation imposed by the
statute on the part of an individual who has mere
knowledge of a crime to disclose it. He must actively
conceal it from a magistrate or harbor or protect the
person who committed it. Consequently, the actions
indicated by counsel for the appellant, Mr. Hatch,
at the time he was arguing in favor of the invocation
of -the ·privilege on the possibility that Mr. Petty
would be subjected to a prosecution as an accessory
do not hold up under the statute.
Finally, the appellant cites Section 76-28-58,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, relating to compounding or concealing crime as being applicable, and
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that had Mr. Petty accepted repayment and indicated that he would not prosecute, he could possibly be guilty under the provisions of that section.
It is submitted that there is no merit to that contention, since Section 76-28-58, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, applies where an individual has knowledge of
the crime, takes money or property of another or
grutuity or award or any engagement of promise
thereof to compound and conceal the crime. The
facts as testified to by the district attorney and even
when construed in a light most favorable to the
appellant, as indicated by Mr. Hatch, does not justify a finding that that provision was violated. Indeed,,
there was merely an understanding, at best, that the·
witness would accept repayment of funds to which
the witness or his company was entitled. This is not
a violation of Section 76-28-58, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. As a matter of broader principle, the State
would be most happy to accept the position urged
by the appellant that his conduct could subject him
to prosecution as an accessory or for concealing or
compounding a crime, for to do so would construe
the Utah statutes in accordance with the commo!l
law offense of misprision of a felony. Russell on
Crime, 12th Ed., Vol. 1, pp 167-168 (1963); Goldberg,
Misprision of Felony: An Old Concept in a New
Context. 52 ABAJ 148 (1966); Regina v. Crimmins.
ll959J V.R. 270.
It is submitted, however, that it was obviously
not the intent of the Legislature to have the above
mentioned sections so broadly construed as appel-
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lant" would now argue. Therefore, there was no possibility of his prosecution under either of the
statutes. Consequently, at the time the appellant refused to answer the third question posed by the
district attorney, there was no likelihood of him incriminating himself.
From what has been said, and at least, certain-

ly, as to the first two questions asked, there was no

likelihood of the appellant in any way incriminating
himself or any tendency that the testimony he would
give would incriminate him. Obviously, the appellant was participating in a defense scheme to
frustrate the prosecution of the case pending against
Billie Maurine Newsom.

In The Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng.
Rep. 730 (1861), it was said as to the privilege:
"Further than this, we are of opinion that the dangpr
to be apprehended must be real and appreciable,
with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the
ordinary course of things-not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference
to some extra-ordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would
suffer it to influence his conduct. We think that a
merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course of the law and such as no reasonable
man would be affected by, should not be suffered to
obstruct the administration of justice. The object of
the law is to afford to a party, called upon to give
evidence in a proceeding inter alios, protection
against being brought by means of his own evidence
within the penalties of the law. But it would be to
convert a salutary protection into a means of abuse
if it were to be held that a mere imaginary possibility
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of danger, however remote and improbable, wa~ sufficient to justify the withholding of evidence essential
to the ends of justice."

The circumstances of the instant case are almost
squarely within the law of the Mason case and
Boyes case referred to above. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that the trial judge,
who saw the witnesses and their expressions.
abused his discretion in finding that there was no
real danger to appellant from answering the prosecution' s questions.
Courts have always recognized a requirement
that there be a substantial likelihood of injury or
actual prosecution. McNaughton, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, Its Constitutional Affection, Raisor D'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications,
51 Jnl. of Crim. Law, Criminology and Police Science, p. 138 (1960).
Even applying the broad standards of Malloy
v. Hogan, supra, as set down by the United States
Supreme Court, it is apparent that there was no substantial likelihood or even a possibility that the appellant's testimony in response to the questions
posed by the district attorney would have incriminated him. See also Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479 0951) at p. 486.
It is submitted that certainly the question of
whether or not the appellant knew Billie Maurine
Newsom could not have had a tendency to incriminate him, and that in any event, even if the other
questions, by the wildest stretch ..of im.a9in~tion,
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could be said to have had a possibility to incriminate, the one question standing and the appellant's
refusal to respond would justify the trial court's conviction.
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO INVOKE HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION BY PREVIOUS STATEMENTS MADE
TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT.

The testimony of District Attorney Jay E. Banks
was to the effect that the appellant had previously
disclosed certain information to him, which information was covered by the questions asked the appellant. It is submitted that, as a consequence, the ap·
pellant has waived any right to claim the privilege
against self-incrimination. The State does not contend that the position argued in this point is supported by the majority of courts. In Re Neff. 206 F.2d
149 (3rd Cir. 1953); 36 A.L.R.2d 1398; Wigmore Evidence, Sec. 2275. However, no decision of the United
States Supreme Court has been found directly pass·
ing on this issue, and it is submitted that the better
rule is that espoused by Professor McCormick in
his treatise on evidence, where he observes that
there "could be a strong contrary argument" on
whether prior disclosure of the incriminating fact
· would be a claim of privilege at a later time on the
· same subject matter..
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Consequently, it is submitted that until the
United States Supreme Court has clearly said that
previous disclosure of evidence that may be subsoquen tl y claimed to be incriminatory does no! csmstitute a waiver, that this court should adopt the
position advocated by Professor McCormick, which
is certainly the most reasonable position. Once the
cat is out of the bag, there seems to be little reason
why the privilege against self-incrimination should
still be available to a witness, especially where the
nature of the prior disclosure was such that the evidence could be used against the individual, if the
prosecution was so inclined to do so.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
appellant had waived his right against self-incrimination.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the record in this case clearly demonstrates that there was no reasonable invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination
by the appellant. There simply was no danger that
the answers to the three questions posed by the district attorney, or any one of them, would tend to
incriminate the appellant. Further, the respondent
submits that even if it can be said that any one of
the questions might have had a tendency to incriminate, that the other questions were such that there
was no possibility of their evoking.an incriminatory
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response. Consequently, the trial court's determination to hold the appellant in contempt was justified.
This qqurt shql),ld affirm.
Respectfully

submitted~

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

